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Introduction  
Libraries are, among other things, storehouses of knowledge. The defining 
characteristic of a storehouse is that there is a concept of creating and maintaining 
security; there are plans and structures in place which are designed to control and protect 
that which is stored. In other words, the goal of library security is to provide a safe 
environment for objects, people, and places which are held to be of value. 
Threats to the idea of security come in many forms, and range from intentional 
acts such as book theft, vandalism, or identity theft to dangers which originate from 
unintentional factors such as flood, fire, and even the naturally depreciative processes of 
time. Library security is typically best understood as a system, one which reflects the 
strategies of planners to prevent or ameliorate the negative consequences of a realized 
threat. 
In order to achieve this goal, a security system is composed of two elements: An 
actual, physical system, consisting of people, devices, and written instructions; and a 
conceptual mission which underlies it. It the most basic terms, this conceptual mission is 
exactly the goal mentioned above, “to provide a safe environment.” In a more 
sophisticated view, this “mission” actually reflects complex philosophical decisions about 
the value of knowledge, the purpose of its protection, and the role of librarians as its 
stewards. This paper presents the idea that one way of accessing, and exploring, the 
philosophical missions that support security systems is by looking closely at security 
policies. 
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The most basic reason for investigating this matter is to provide a better quality of 
service for both library patrons and for library collections. Although the specifics of 
security concerns are certainly evolving throughout time, the basic charge of a library to 
protect knowledge has not, and never will, change. For this reason, it is critical to the 
health of librarianship and library science that we deeply explore these matters of 
security, which lie so close to the very heart of our purpose. 
In order to proceed, it is important to provide some working descriptions of useful 
terms. Throughout the course of this paper, all of these ideas will be expanded and 
developed, but these definitions will provide stable starting points, the first few of which 
are gathered from the work of Bruce Scheiner: 
 
Security 
Perhaps the most technical definition available can be found in the Department of 
Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, where security is explained as 
follows:  
“A condition that results from the establishment and maintenance of 
protective measures that ensure a state of inviolability from hostile acts or 
influences. 2. With respect to classified matter, the condition that prevents 
unauthorized persons from having access to official information that is 
safeguarded in the interests of national security. 3. Measures taken by a 
military unit, an activity or installation to protect itself against all acts 
designed to, or which may, impair its effectiveness” (DOD Pub 1-02, p. 
2). 
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Although this gives a clear view, a slightly more nuanced definition can be found 
in Scheiner’s Beyond Fear, where he writes, “Security is about preventing adverse 
consequences from the intentional and unwarranted actions of others” (Scheiner, Beyond 
Fear: p. 12). 
 
Security System 
“A security system is the set of things put in place, or done, to prevent adverse 
consequences.” (Scheiner, Beyond Fear: p. 12). For the purposes of this paper (although 
the subject will be later addressed) I will largely overlook Scheiner’s distinction between 
security and safety in the context of a security system: “Protecting assets from 
unintentional actions is safety, not security” (p. 12). 
 
Threat and Risk 
“A threat is a potential way that an attacker can attack a system… When security 
professionals talk about risk, they take into consideration both the likelihood of the threat 
and the seriousness of a successful attack” (Scheiner, Beyond Fear: p. 20). 
 
Security Policy 
For this paper, I will define a security policy, in the most basic sense, as a set of 
plans or guidelines intended to direct the response to potential and actualized threats. 
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Mission 
Finally, the use of the word mission, here, is intended to provide a sense of not 
only intent or mandate, but also those parts of a set of decisions which are influenced by 
deeply held beliefs and ontologies. 
 
This paper will explore these various ideas in terms of the most recent literature of 
library science, comparing and contrasting a number of approaches to both the practical 
and philosophical understandings of security. Following upon this, I will further develop 
the idea of security and advance the theory that library policy represents the most direct 
connection between the two poles of security as a mundane reality and security as a 
complex set of ideas. Finally, it is hoped that this process will present a more holistic and 
“three-dimensional” view of library security and, in so doing, provide a useful starting 
point for further research and scholarship. 
6 
 
Questions and definitions 
The consideration of library safety and security has certainly been of critical 
importance since the earliest collections of recorded knowledge. In modern times, these 
issues are considered to be an important part of the discipline of preservation in libraries 
and archives, but related concerns impact all areas of librarianship. It is certain that every 
library in the world, whether tacitly or explicitly, has addressed the issues of protecting 
its collection, as well as its library facility, library staff, and library patronage.  
 Security is a multi-faceted concept, as it represents a number of ideas, including a 
state, a condition, a feeling, and a process. Each of these notions will be investigated 
throughout this paper, but the working definition in operation here is two-fold: One, 
security is the practical, physical, process of controlling the state of a library’s collection, 
staff, patronage, and facility; Two, security is a concept which encompasses the 
emotional and rational process of doing the same.  
 In beginning to attempt to define security, it is a common approach to define the 
idea of a “threat.” In the most concrete sense, a threat is any agent or condition which 
counteracts the process of controlling the state of a library’s collection, staff, patronage, 
and facility. For the purposes of this paper, the idea of threats will not be closely 
examined, but the term will be used in a general sense to refer to criminal activity, natural 
disasters, inherent vice, and all of the other multifarious vectors of attack upon an 
instantiation of security. 
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 Along with “security,” and “threat,” the third label which will be frequently used 
is “policy.” In the realm of the philosophy of security, as presented in this paper, policy 
refers to a strategy which bridges the conceptual structure of security with the actual, 
practical, implementation of security. This bridge is critical and will be addressed at 
length throughout this discussion. 
The subject of library security has been outlined and surveyed in a variety of 
studies (Janus 2001, et. al.), often with the intent of suggesting ways and means of 
improving the quality of existing security (Nilsen 2003), or of designing improved 
security systems for future implementation (Scire 2003). These works are a critical part 
of the practice of librarianship. 
This paper suggests that scholarship regarding this topic would be well-served 
and improved by a thoughtful consideration of the underlying principles which drive 
security policy decisions. It is very common that security policy is implemented in a 
developing or iterative manner, often without the exact reasoning behind that policy 
having been made clear to those who enforce it. A clearly presented analysis of the 
alignment between principle and practice might provide significant insight into the 
motivations and actions of policy-makers. In other words, it is important that librarians 
and library policy-makers alike understand why security decisions are made. 
There are several standard approaches to considerations of security, most of 
which center upon the practical and pragmatic securement of physical assets. In contrast, 
this paper will address the concept of security in terms of the philosophy which underlies 
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it. In the case of library security, there are several levels of complexity which must be 
evaluated and appreciated for their unique character. 
“Philosophy,” of course, literally means “love of wisdom.” It is also a notoriously 
evasive target for definition. So much so, in fact, that it is often best known in terms of its 
schools, such as objectivism or relativism. My use of the term here is intended to evoke 
some of the nuance which characterizes matters of mission, faith, intent, concept, and 
ontology. 
The spirit of this investigation is largely informed by Michael Renner, who wrote 
in the Worldwatch Institute’s State of the World 2005 that: “First, a… security policy 
needs to be transformative in nature… The second principle flows from this insight: a 
new security policy must above all be preventive in nature… The third principle is that 
a… security policy needs to be cross-cutting and integrative” (p. 16). The idea of 
integrative policy resonates closely with my idea that policy is that which integrates 
practice and philosophy in the realm of library security. 
This paper will, as a matter of necessity, skirt the role of library mission 
statements (as expressed both directly and in terms of non-security-related standards, 
principles, and guidelines), as they determine library security practice and policy. 
Towards this end, the following supplemental research questions will be considered and, 
if not fully explored, at least acknowledged: 
 How is library security defined? 
 What are the purposes of library security? 
 What measures are used for evaluating the quality of library security? 
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 How are instances of “better” library security caused by more direct 
correspondence to underlying library mission statements? 
From that starting point, this paper will survey some of the pertinent literature in 
the field with an eye towards viewing the distinction between “practical” studies of 
security and the “philosophical” studies of security.  
Concurrent with the review, we will explain the use of the term philosophy and 
address the importance of these concepts to essential library policy. Finally, this paper 
suggests that the best means of understanding security in a library is as a direct extension 
of the values which underlay policy. It is hoped that this process will emerge from the 
field which has been thus circumscribed – In fact, the true goal of this paper is to use 
fringe and outlying studies of library security to begin the process of defining the field of 
the philosophy of library security. 
It is fitting to consider the question of “why” not only in terms of library security 
policy, but also in regards to this paper. Especially in the context of a post-9/11 United 
States, issues of library security have become increasingly discussed. Necessarily, as in 
articles such as Viscusi (2003) and any number of Brown-Syed’s insightful works, these 
studies often center upon ideas of privacy and information security. These ideas are quite 
evocative, eliciting the kinds of questions which lie at the heart of the study currently 
being outlined. 
Perhaps one of the most poignant examples of this category of scholarship is, 
“The Safeguarding of Memory: The Divine Function of the Librarian and Archivist” 
(Owens 2003). This article, written by a rare books librarian, proposes a consideration of 
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the librarian as being a guardian of memory, especially in the face of tragedies such as 
genocide. The notion of “safeguarding” is the notion of security, eloquently expressed in 
a way which echoes both the pragmatic and philosophical architectures which direct it. 
Alao’s (2004) “The Effectiveness of Library Measures Against Theft and 
Mutilation: An Opinion Survey” performed an analysis of African library security 
measures and concluded that, “diversification of library security measures should be 
based on considerations of cost-effectiveness” (p. 29). It is a significant idea, and one 
which drives much policy decision-making (indeed, perhaps all policy decision-making), 
that collections and – by extension – facilities, staffs, and patronages can be considered to 
be assets. In this context, it seems like a logical extension of policy analysis to look at 
philosophical decisions in the form of ideas about security missions and policies and, 
indeed, these themes of mission and purpose are at the heart of this paper. It bears 
mention for both this reason and also for its potential value as a piece of scholarship 
which can be seen as representative of the mainstream of security scholarship. 
These works, however, from studies of privacy to reviews of mission statements, 
are insufficient for the particular quest to work towards completing our understanding of 
how philosophy and practice are connected. This paper will attempt to demonstrate that 
there is a correlation between library security philosophy and actual, practical, library 
security. Furthermore, this paper shows that the correlation is best mapped in terms of 
policy. 
This process will be characterized by pointing to examples of existing efforts to 
chart this domain; much of this paper is a comparative literature review of the most 
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cutting-edge scholarship of library security. In presenting this review, and connecting 
some of the dots between the scholarship thus represented, it will endeavor to provide a 
clear connection between the philosophies which underlie security practices and provide 
a generative example for further study of this subject area. 
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Current scholarship about library security 
Investigating the problem of how library security can be seen to succeed or fail in 
direct correlation to the degree of clarity which supports it; this literature review presents 
an overview of several pertinent research articles. The subject articles are separated into 
two broad categories, “practice” and “philosophy.” 
“Practice-related” literature 
An article by William E. Chadwick, “Special Collections Library Security: An 
Internal Audit Perspective” (1998), was written as a technical appraisal of the reported 
increase of theft and fraud in special collections libraries. Like Sowd (2003), he points 
out that there has been a dramatic increase in the market value of rare books during the 
1980s, and cites this as one of the three primary reasons for an ever-growing number of 
instances of theft. The other, equally important, factors are the development of “user-
friendly” environments (and the subsequent implementation of lax protective measures) 
and the practical difficulties of protecting the collection. Both of these two categories 
have led to poor “internal control” of library collections. This author defines “internal 
control” as being a collection of five activities: 1) controlling the collection environment, 
2) risk assessment, 3) control activities, 4) information and communication, and 5) 
monitoring. 
In his analysis of internal control, Chadwick notices that there is a shift away from 
acceptance and selective tolerance of white-collar crime. He states that libraries which 
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would once minimize outside perception of the frequency and impact of “gentlemen’s 
crimes” such as theft are now coming to an understanding of these kinds of crime as 
being, perhaps, the most dangerous of all security violations for the integrity of a 
collection. 
In outlining his suggestions for improving special collections security, Chadwick 
distinguishes between Internal Audit and the role of library personnel concerning library 
control responsibility. The former, he explains, is a form of high-level practice which 
more closely aligns with the spirit of an institution’s security policy. The latter, then, is 
more a matter of actual, manifest, day-to-day activity. With this distinction, the author is 
highlighting a critical distinction that resonates with the topic of this literature review. 
Throughout the balance of the article, Chadwick uses a variety of engaging headings 
(“Fort Knox vs. User-Friendly”) to group and address topics such as causes of theft 
(using statistics collected from the Institute for Financial Crime Prevention), “Red Flags,” 
creating an Employee Code of Conduct and Business Ethics Policy, as well as practical 
issues such as library egress controls.  
Steven J Herman’s “Developing a Plan for Collections Security: The Library of 
Congress Experience” (2003) is an insightful walk through his personal experience with 
the Library of Congress’s comprehensive security plan revision of 1997. He provides a 
very detailed description of the process by which the Library of Congress outlined their 
security situation and needs, planned for improvements, and then implemented those 
improvements. 
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The article describes the four areas which were considered crucial for developing 
a satisfactory security plan: Physical security, Preservation, Bibliographic control, and 
Inventory control. In a nicely systematic fashion, the library then created a schema for 
prioritizing protection across five tiers of risk and five collections cycles. As an example 
of how to design security systems, Herman demonstrates exactly how principles of 
security can be directly represented in a system’s design. For the purposes of the topic 
being considered by this review, this conceptual prototype may prove to be quite valuable 
and this detailed description even more so. 
Herman, subjectively, considers the Library of Congress security plan revision 
project to have been a success. He mentions a variety of advantages of the new system 
over the one which it replaced: Namely, that it represents a number of ideas which may 
be considered tenets of a good security plan, such as “Collaborative effort, Shared 
vocabulary, an approved and understandable plan, a blueprint for action, and a synergistic 
approach.” Although these are all interesting, evocative, ideas, Herman provides slight 
evidence and explanation of why they are essential. Nonetheless, this article provides a 
template for looking at specific standards which meld practice and philosophy, as well as 
very clearly describing the fact that employee “buy-in” and perception are essential to a 
successful plan implementation. 
Kristin M. Janus’s “Securing Our History” (2001) is an historical overview of the 
library literature and media coverage of thefts from rare book rooms. Using this survey as 
a sort of rallying cry, she challenges practitioners and scholars to press for more severe 
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legal penalties, to raise awareness of the seriousness of thefts, to keep inventories up to 
date, and to incorporate the possibilities of theft into disaster plans. 
Focusing upon the twin threats of theft and mutilation, Janus proposes the idea 
that improved inventory and collection control procedures are insufficient for the task of 
preventing theft. One way that awareness of the problem was raised arose from the 
publication of lists of missing and known stolen materials from victimized institutions, 
but she states that that awareness of – and candor regarding – theft did not eventually 
begin to spread until as late as 1982: “Better late than never, concern began to mount 
from this point forward as the reality of library, archive and special collection theft 
became increasing acknowledged and efforts to combat the growing problem began to 
truly increase” (p. 6). 
She identifies and categorizes common library thieves, while bemoaning the fact 
that most U.S. law enforcement agencies apparently do not have the understanding, time, 
staff or training to properly deal with the theft of unique library materials from their 
various depositories. This leaves libraries to address the special nature of their own 
library concerns while, ironically, they are often the “last to know” when a large theft 
occurs.  
She writes extensively about the myths surrounding thieves such as Martin Strich, 
Ted Donson, and Stephen Blumberg as examples of the fanciful ideas that undercut 
attempts to publicize and describe the dangers posed by art and rare book thieves, 
advancing a public and policy-maker perception that clouds any knowledge of the threat 
being presented. According to Janus, “In the United States, and elsewhere in the world, 
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some of the most valuable and intrinsically worthwhile materials will most certainly be 
lost forever if timely action is not taken to seriously minimize occurrences of theft in 
libraries, archives, museums and special collections” (p. 12). She argues that an increase 
in the penalties attached to these thefts, reflective of the value of the items stolen, would 
provide a better deterrent to prospective thieves than that presented under current 
legislation.  
On balance, this article is a nice survey which participates nicely in the stream of 
scholarship that acknowledges the critical importance of perception in matters of risk, 
threat, and security assessment. 
Thomas Latusek, Jr. is an important voice in the discussion of security matters, 
and his “Library Security: A Growing Awareness” (2000) is an excellent article which 
describes incidents with problem patrons in libraries while stressing the importance of 
security plans. Latusek discusses the current trend toward extended hours of operation for 
academic libraries and, with such emerging changes in the security landscape in mind, 
offers first-hand experiences with security planning.  
Latusek’s discussion focuses on planning measures primarily as a means to create 
a heightened consciousness of library security, emphasizing technological questions and 
policy concerns. In this way, he anticipates more sophisticated ideas such as those of 
Herman, Janus, and Sowd, who explicitly expanded upon the implications of the 
interactions between these themes.  Alongside others such as Levett (1992) and Shuman 
(1997), Latusek represents part of the foundation of thought and scholarship in the field. 
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“As Strong as Its Weakest Link: The Human Element” (2003), by Laurie Sowd, 
points out that, “Too often, we fail to give full weight to the importance of our people – 
the human element” (p. 29). Her article looks at the motivations of the staff which is 
responsible for realizing security plans and policy: Why do they do what they do? What 
do they seek in a work environment? 
Sowd’s idea is that a sense of purpose is one of the most important ways of 
understanding why security fails or succeeds at its intended mission. She states that the 
components of a security program are three-fold: staff, technical systems, and policies 
and procedures, with training “tying these components together.” Given that, in her view, 
security is reduced (or, I might offer, elevated) to its human components, she considers 
several social and emotional attributes of library staff: as well as the aforementioned 
“sense of purpose,” she lists social interaction, “Clarity of role,” and opportunities for 
advancement as the four central areas for evaluating the potential security-related 
strength of library employees. 
As she builds her recommendations for ways to address these ideas in an applied 
manner, Sowd cites the United States @ Work 2000 study, and the seven “key ways by 
which a company can build employee loyalty” (p. 31). Here, the article becomes 
something of a how-to guide in terms of motivating employees, such as granting 
additional responsibility and opportunities for advancement. 
Sowd provides the example of the Huntington library, where the staff was presented 
with a security policy that outlined five broad objectives for self-assessment:  
1. The library experiences no loss that could have been reasonably expected. 
18 
 
2. Staff perceive that they add value. 
3. Visitors perceive that security adds value. 
4. Management believes that security is efficient and effective, 
5. Security officers believe that the library, itself, adds value to their lives. 
Sowd’s work is included here because it is an interesting example of holistic thinking 
in terms of policy meeting practice. She acknowledges the importance of the human 
factor in security systems and states that, in focusing upon that factor, security systems 
can be measurably improved. 
“Philosophy-related” literature 
Stacie Conchie’s article, “Trust: Missing Piece(s) in the Safety Puzzle” (2006), 
does not directly address security, within or without the context of a library setting. But it 
is worth considering in the body of this review because of her investigation of the human 
element in designing and considering safety (a ready substitute for security) systems. 
She focused her article (which, in fact, serves as an introduction to a sequence of other 
articles) on the issue of trust. She states that “while trust is increasingly recognized as a 
factor that impacts on safety behavior, the exact nature of trust and its role in shaping 
organizational safety is poorly understood” (p. 1097). Similar to authors such as Rogers 
(2007), who are, in fact, librarians, Conchie sees the complex nature of trust and the 
positive and negative roles that trust can play in shaping an organization’s safety 
(security) culture.  
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Conchie, like Sowd, sees that researchers and practitioners have started to 
examine the impact of interpersonal processes on employees’ safety-related behavior. In 
her case, she focuses on trust, defined as “an individual’s willingness to rely on another 
person based on expectations that he or she will act safely or intends to act safely” (p. 
1097).  Although she uses examples such as the safety analyses of disasters like the North 
Sea Piper Alpha explosion, the parallels to security system analysis are very clear.  
In a manner similar to Herman, Conchie develops the idea that trust is a 
synergizing element of a system, yet one which has been incompletely investigated and 
mapped: “One consequence of this absence of direct empirical attention is that the 
relationship of trust with safety is poorly understood” (p. 1098). In order to correct this, 
Conchie writes about the three dimensions of trust: trust, mistrust, and creative mistrust, 
the last of which is precisely the nature of security system design and consideration.  
This article is included because of the process-focused manner in which Conchie 
suggests advancing empirical, quantitative, studies of trust in the workplace: “Through a 
mapping sentence, the abstract nature of trust, which many researchers grapple with 
(Gambetta, 1988), can be clearly defined and a move can be made toward a single 
definition of trust… (A) move away from conceptualizing trust as a single construct and 
show some of the different effects that trust can have on safety within highrisk (sic) 
contexts…  To achieve this, programs might focus on improving beliefs and feelings 
about another’s trustworthiness” (p. 1103).  
Brian M. Owens, the author of “The Safeguarding of Memory: The Divine 
Function of the Librarian and Archivist” (2003), states as a matter of fact that archivists 
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and librarians are entrusted with the responsibility of preserving manuscripts, books and 
electronic format. Beyond this, however, his article describes this function as being 
almost akin to a kind of spiritual cultural stewardship, and one which is being 
dramatically challenged by the threats of terror, violence, and cultural genocide which 
plague the modern world. It is not misrepresenting Owens’s thesis to quote him thusly: 
“In essence we (librarians) are charged with the maintenance and preservation of 
memory. We have been assigned with a divine act” (p. 11). 
His article explores the destructive acts which have destroyed books and 
manuscripts, “and hence, have assisted in the eradication of social memory” (p. 12).  In 
doing so, Owens outlines not only his somewhat romantic view of libraries, but also the 
real spiritual undercurrents that support it.  
Owens invokes Owen Feltham, who “acknowledged in The Face of the Book, 
Unmasked, the codex, or its primogenitor, the electronic book, sustains the truth; the 
whole of the Universe is embodied and ignorance is distracted” (p. 34). Despite the lack 
of concrete empiricism in this article, Owens lends a powerful voice to the discourse of 
library security and, in so doing, speaks directly to the questions which undergird this 
literature review. 
Gary P. Radford’s “Positivism, Foucault, and the Fantasia of the Library: 
Conceptions of knowledge and the modern library experience” suggests that perceptions 
of library environments, from both observers and participants, are, historically, informed 
by a particular kind of positivism. Specifically, Radford proposes that our ideas about 
neutrality and access to information reflect “twentieth-century” ideas that scientific 
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knowledge is not only inherently superior to other kinds of knowledge, but should be 
used as a model for understanding how to construct and manage systems to organize data. 
Radford, instead, follows the ideas of Michel Foucault to offer the idea that the library 
can be seen as a dynamic space, one which encompasses a librarian role as both “an eager 
seeker of knowledge and… as a quasi-mystical guardian of a great temple of knowledge” 
(p. 409). Although Radford writes in more general terms of the library “experience,” 
there are clear extensions into particular topics such as library security, especially as 
framed as a matter of mission. 
Eric Sheffield’s “Beyond Abstraction: Philosophy as a Practical Qualitative 
Research Method” stretches the limits of this paper’s porous perimeters, in that it is even 
more removed from the matter of library security that almost any other article herein 
addressed. Nonetheless, the thesis of Sheffield’s work is very evocative and pertinent. 
Beyond Abstraction makes use of a specific example to illustrated Sheffield’s effort to 
redeem philosophy as a powerful tool for qualitative research. He provides a cogent and 
comprehensive overview of the idea of philosophy as a social practice, tracing the 
methodological tools and subject matter involved. Importantly, Sheffield works with the 
ideas of John Dewey who wrote extensively about the nature of philosophy as being 
grounded in lived experience. Sheffield’s interpretation of this idea is clear: 
“Philosophers have the particularly important chore of clarifying our thinking as to 
constructs that both clarify experience and direct practice. That methodological purpose 
is important not simply as a means for philosophers to understand concepts, language, 
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and logic as they operate in real, lived, experience, but it provides a necessary discussion 
that can become the basis for other kinds of research.” (p. 765) 
Sheffield, in other words, sees philosophy as a valuable tool for understanding 
study and practice and that conclusion finds common voice in the effort represented by 
this paper. His idea is echoed and amplified by Michelle M. Byrne, author of “Linking 
philosophy, methodology, and methods in qualitative research.” Byrne extends the idea 
of philosophy’s utility into explicit categories including phenomenology and 
hermeneutics, drawing clear lines between the methods and means of philosophy and 
those of qualitative research. Similar efforts can be found in the writings of Frank 
Crossan, but it is not the agenda of this paper to outline these terms in exhaustive terms, 
but it is the agenda to point out that these kinds of connections are known, are accepted to 
be useful, and are being explored by meaningful scholarship. 
Finally, David E. Woolwine, in “Libraries and the Balance of Liberty and 
Security” (2007), states that, the USA Patriot Act has presented librarians in the United 
States with a dilemma. According to him, there is a need to balance national security 
against values embedded in a long-standing American understanding of civil liberty and 
human rights. 
He refers to the discussion of the problem created for libraries by the USA Patriot 
Act and Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act by Jaeger, Bertot, & McClure, 2003 and 
Jaeger, McClure, Bertot, & Snead (2004), Martorella (2006), addressing the idea that the 
“balance of liberty and security, and how to argue for such balance, remain as permanent 
features of our times…  security ethicists can begin to address this issue by examining 
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limited and specific responses to the need for balance and then subjecting these responses 
to an ethical critique” (p. 1). 
He presents this kind of critique in an ethical analysis of the deliberations of non-
governmental organizations, such as the American Library Association. Woolwine is 
approaching the exact theme of this review’s topic here, as his is a study in professional 
ethics related to the reasoning of the ALA as contained in their security and privacy 
policies.  
Woolwine, in his analysis of the ALA, explains the two forms of ethical 
arguments by the ALA: 1) types of utilitarianism and, 2) forms of rights discourse that 
are asserted rather than argued for. He sees arguments of both types as being insufficient. 
In his article, he provides an analysis of modern and postmodern conceptions and 
applications of the idea of “privacy,” suggesting that a synthesis might be the most useful 
means for moving into a more functional argumentative space. This amalgam of the 
modern and postmodern views first argues that autonomous selves require access to 
information and culture in order to be autonomous -- in order to choose what types of 
lives they hope to live or in order to give true internal assent to what they take to be truth. 
Secondly, however, the synthesis relies heavily upon the notion of dialogue.  
“The members of modern societies should, inasmuch as they are in fact 
choosing, or assenting to, their values be sufficiently sophisticated to 
know what they are choosing, or assenting to, and why. Here there is a 
need for a public dialogue and for an informed and cultured public. The 
need for dialogue is grounded, however, in something other than, but 
similar to, utilitarianism. It is in the public dialogue that one connects up, 
in critical ways, with larger narratives and where one works to change or 
refine both oneself and such narratives. Freedom of access to information 
and to cultural products are required for this dialogue, consistent with 
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national security needs. This is not an absolutist position on either side” 
(p. 9). 
 
I provide this lengthy quote, rather than a paraphrase, to provide additional insight 
into the character of this argument, as well as its content. Woolwine’s focus is upon 
access rights, rather than security, but he is treading upon the same territory as this 
review’s topic, especially when he combines this rather philosophical view with a 
critique of the ALA’s form of reasoning in formulation of policy. He suggests that there 
is a sort of placatory inconsistency in the ALA policy, something which necessarily 
weakens the strength of that policy. 
Woolwine’s thesis is that the ALA, as a policy-making entity, needs to pursue a 
vigorous and nuanced internal dialog in order to precisely articulate the reasoning which 
underlies its policy. This work is an excellent example of the kind of research which 
addresses my topic. 
This literature review provides the context in which this paper operates. Although 
the precise subject area has yet to be fully charted, these important pieces of scholarship 
will assist my work by providing examples of methodological approaches, important 
indicators for additional references, and a sense of the community of scholarship which 
attempts to investigate intersections of philosophy and practice. 
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Security as a concept 
By its very nature, the American Library Association is the prime creator and 
arbiter for matters of library policy (at least in this country). Although the earliest 
attempts to codify policy matters seem to have been quite basic in formulation – The aim 
of the Association, in that resolution, was to “enable librarians to do their present work 
more easily and at less expense" (p. 1). – The modern ALA Policy Manual is a fairly 
extensive document. It is intended to provide a framework for understanding the role and 
manifest practice of librarianship in the context of American libraries. In pursuit of this 
goal, the ALA Policy addresses a number of key concerns, including Personnel and 
Professional Resources, support of legislation which strengthens library services, and 
matters of Intellectual Property. It also outlines the ALA’s attitude as regards the access 
to information, both as a sort of spiritual ideal and as a matter of practical application.  
It may or may not be an acceptable standard to assume that library security can be 
seen to succeed or fail in direct correlation to the degree of clarity which supports it, but 
for the purposes of this paper, I will assume this to be the case. What is certainly 
acceptable standard is the common use of statements of a kind or like to the ALA Policy. 
In a slightly revisionist mirror, this policy – and, indeed, all security polices – should be 
seen as participating in an essential dilemma: 
 One: Access to information is about letting people at it. 
 Two: Security is about keeping people away from it. 
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Of course, we know that the reality – even the desired, utopian, reality – lies in 
the middle of these two points, a floating balance. Just as a chaotic free-for-all of 
information would mean madness, so would a draconian, glacial, lockdown of 
information mean intellectual absolute zero. The skill of an information professional lies 
in developing and explaining the space between the two, for access is about control and 
control is about security. 
So, just what triggers concern about security? There is some truth to the idea that 
it is the most primal of impulses to protect things of value. Security, following this idea, 
can be seen as a responsive set of constructs which are designed to allow for this 
protection. 
Security is the condition of being protected against danger or loss. In the general 
sense, security is a concept similar to safety. The specific nuance between the two is an 
added emphasis that the former constitutes a state of being protected from dangers that 
originate from outside. Individuals or actions that encroach upon the condition of being 
protected are responsible for a breach of security. To elaborate further, the word 
"security" in general usage is synonymous with "safety," but as a technical term 
"security" means that something not only is secure but that it has been secured. Security 
might fruitfully be compared and contrasted with other related concepts: safety, 
continuity, reliability. While safety was mentioned above, continuity also has its place as 
the idea of a given environment possessing a resolute and continuing state – The goal of 
security is to provide continuity so that the state of a library can be maintained in 
accordance with its mission. The key distinction between security and the idea of 
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reliability is that security must take into account the actions of active malicious agents 
attempting to cause negative or undesired effects. 
It is quite often true that people's perception of security is not directly related to 
actual security. For example, a fear of being a passenger in an airplane is far more 
common than a fear of riding in a car; however, automobile transportation is generally far 
more dangerous than travel by plane. A similarly common kind of security misperception 
is that a tool may be mistaken for the effect, for example when multiple computer 
security programs interfere with each other, so the user assumes the computer is secure 
when actual security has vanished. There are a wide-ranging number of non- and 
irrational security perceptions that color every aspect of everyday life, including the life 
of a collection or an institution. 
Another important facet of security is the phenomenon known as “security 
theater,” wherein demonstratively ineffective security measures (such as screening of 
library patrons in based on posted, static, lists of known thieves) are introduced with little 
real increase in security-- or even with an actual decrease in real security. 
The interesting nature of security theater, however, is that if it is perceived that 
there is security then there will be an increase in actual security, even if that perception of 
security is mistaken. If signage warns that video surveillance is observing an area -- even 
if there is no actual visual surveillance -- malicious agents will often be deterred by the 
belief that there may be. Furthermore, when there is actual security present in an area, 
such as video surveillance in a reading area, an alarm system in a special collection, or an 
anti-theft system such as tattletape, signs advertising this security will increase its 
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effectiveness, protecting the value of the secured holding or area itself. Since some 
intruders will decide not to attempt to criminally penetrate such areas, there can actually 
be less damage to the surrounding environment in addition to protection of valuable 
objects inside. Without such advertisement, a book-thief might, for example, attempt to 
remove a book from the building and then flee in response to an alarm being triggered.  
In either eventuality, whether or not a negative act has been committed, perceived 
security has the net effect of improving actual security. It is important, however, for signs 
advertising security not to give clues as to how to subvert that security, for example in the 
case where a home burglar might be more likely to break into a certain home if he or she 
is able to learn beforehand which company makes its security system. 
Philosophy of Security 
Security, as a concern, is among the most basic organic impulses. Technically, 
I’ve offered several different definitions for what I mean by my use of the term, with the 
most basic being something along the lines of what can be found in a dictionary (in this 
case, http://www.Merriam-Webster.com, accessed March 12, 2008): 
1: the quality or state of being secure: as a: freedom from danger : safety 
b: freedom from fear or anxiety c: freedom from the prospect of being laid 
off <job security> 2 a: something given, deposited, or pledged to make 
certain the fulfillment of an obligation b: surety 3: an instrument of 
investment in the form of a document (as a stock certificate or bond) 
providing evidence of its ownership4 a: something that secures 
: protection b (1): measures taken to guard against espionage or sabotage, 
crime, attack, or escape (2): an organization or department whose task is 
security. 
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With this in mind, the other part of my binary realm is that of philosophy. In the 
simplest terms, I have herein misused the term philosophy to refer to the value theory of 
security. This is to say, how people positively and negatively value things and concepts, 
the reasons they use in making their evaluations and the scope of applications of 
legitimate evaluations across the social world. 
Really, what I am talking about here is the idea of a security mission: The policy 
which reflects the constellation of decisions which address the diverse field of 
access/prevention and concept/practice. As mentioned previously, the ineffable center 
and fringe of this field is, in fact, the sphere of human influence and practice, the 
decisions and actions of real human participants in a security environment. And, not to 
put too fine a point on it, but this is also the ultimate reality of security that we can see 
demonstrated in the dynamic between security and security theatre. 
Brigham Young University offers a nice example of a library security mission 
statement thusly: “The mission of the library security department is to protect the patrons, 
employees and collections of the library; while creating a secure and peaceful 
environment to enhance educational and professional pursuits of all persons within.”  
 To take a different approach, consider Beth Patkus, who asks the following 
questions: “What benefits will there be to collections if librarians, archivists, and security 
personnel are encouraged to consider security in a more holistic way? Can an 
understanding by security staff of collection preservation activities make it easier to begin 
and maintain preventive activities and help create more comprehensive and effective 
security and preservation programs? Why are existing policies to deal with theft and 
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vandalism so difficult to enforce? Can cooperation between staff responsible for 
preservation and for security improve this situation?” (p. 68) 
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Conclusions 
This brief paper has presented material which is unified in general subject matter, 
if not technique. The thoughts represented in the literature review reflect and refract 
issues of modern security and the policy which precede, support, and follow from them. 
In reviewing the differing strategies which various authors have employed, one can see 
similarities in approach: most authors feel compelled, for example, to create a list of 
security principles. Further, most have created at least one additional list of 
characteristics, whether as observations or as guidelines, which describe a philosophical 
or humanistic view of security matters.  
The shadow of the current political and social climate is long, indeed, and 
scholarship of library security reflects the realities of an environment which contains real 
concerns about terrorism, identity theft, and the loss of privacy and identity in an 
increasingly technological world. It is perhaps this reality, more than any other, which 
might explain the motivation to quantify the philosophical and spiritual facets of library 
science. 
Looking forward, we can see that there is still much work to be done in defining 
this subject area. Comparative studies of the “security principle” lists is one area which 
might provide fruitful scholarship, as would be an investigation into the budgetary 
decision-and-implementation processes that are involved in library security policy 
development. This proposal demonstrates that there is also scholarship yet to be done in 
outlining a method for evaluating the effectiveness of a security system and, moreover, 
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that one means of developing such a method would be considering the human elements 
which are so intrinsic to security interests. 
So, to step back, my essential question was this: “What connects philosophy and 
practice -- What is the point of security policy?” 
Woolwine’s two ideas of how people answer the question (Utilitarianism and 
Rights discourse) is one of the most thoughtful starting points, but I feel like there are a 
host of other important issues that orbit around this topic: 
What is the space between policy and practice? Is it people? What kinds of 
questions should we be asking? What is the value of this inquiry? Why does it seem like 
such an important thing to think about (we hear a lot about policy and mission, after all)? 
Looking forward, I begin to consider the other places to investigate; places like Gap 
Theory, Liminal Theory, Metaphor Theory, Risk Assessment Study, and even areas as 
large as the whole field of Psychology.  Needless to say, I am ill-equipped to really, 
critically, evaluate so many subject areas. However, to beg your indulgence for yet 
another list, I began to assemble a set of working concepts to use as guideposts in my 
investigation. Specifically, I believe the following maxims to be true:  
 It’s important to separate issues of the current political climate from this particular 
discourse 
 It is critical to know why we do things 
 There are ways of looking at and mapping the gap between policy and practice 
 That gap is actually part of a continuum 
 We need to be explicit as we write policies 
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 We need to be iterative and evolving as we write policies 
 We need to be collective and cooperative as we write policies 
 We need to understand the expectations of readers, patrons, and people as actors 
 We need to understand policy to be organic 
All of which inexorably moves one to the stance that I need to reconsider the most 
basic and human processes of assessing risk and security as I try to think about what 
policy means. So, finally, I arrived at the theory which I have been investigating, perhaps 
best exemplified by Bruce Scheiner’s “The Psychology of Security.” 
Scheiner’s essential observation is that. “Security is both a feeling and a reality. 
And they're not the same” (p. 1). He explains that the reality of security is a matter of 
mathematics, a series of calculations based on cost/benefit analysis. These computations 
are actually rather statistically measurable, but the tricky part of understanding and 
evaluating security is that reality that it is also an emotional quantity. Furthermore, it is 
not simply emotional, but, rather, a complex amalgam of judgment, experience, and pre-
rational assumptions – often informed by primal urges – which often work in direct 
opposition to the “statistical reality” of any given circumstance. 
 Scheiner uses a survey of four fields of research as a map for looking at the issue 
of the psychology of security: behavioral economics (also known as behavioral finance), 
psychology of decision-making (especially the idea of bounded rationality), direct 
research into the psychology of risk, and neuroscience. 
 Scheiner admits that his proposed unifying field is very large, very complex, and 
still unclearly-bounded:  
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“In some ways I feel like a magpie, and that much of this essay is me 
saying: "Look at this! Isn't it fascinating? Now look at this other thing! 
Isn't that amazing, too?" Somewhere amidst all of this, there are threads 
that tie it together, lessons we can learn (other than "people are weird"), 
and ways we can design security systems that take the feeling of security 
into account rather than ignoring it” (p. 2). 
 
However, he does an excellent job of building a language for his theory, one 
which I find very useful. Although the limits of this summary preclude an exhaustive 
outline of his theory, some of the key ideas include the trade-offs of risk, the physical 
processes of the human brain in risky situations, and prospect theory. Scheiner uses a 
variety of specific examples, most notably from the work of authors such as Paul 
Samuelson and Robert Cialdini. 
You, dear reader, will remember at the outset of this paper that vague claims were 
made about control and access and security. Really, there should have been some claims 
about preservation thrown in there, explicitly, as well, for there is an important sense in 
which that is part of the same continuum, as well. But what is the objective? What is the 
mission? This is purpose of policy and this is the point of Woolwine’s “synthesis.” But, 
more than a synthesis, I think that there are richer, more fertile, metaphors: Dance, 
balance, storytelling. Of course, there is more to explain, more to develop, but we can 
consider ourselves exercised and bettered, perhaps, by this trip, if we can look back over 
our path and notice the scenery. 
This kind of study is important because the issues of risk and security are 
eternally topical and endlessly poignant. In terms of the design, administration, and 
management of a library or information-focused environment, risk and security are 
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subjects which have traditionally factored into decisions about both policy and practice in 
a variety of manners. This paper suggests that an understanding of these topics is, in fact, 
central to the study and profession of librarianship. I believe that a profession or vocation 
requires clarity about its own purpose in order to justify its continued existence, and 
advancing a body of work which will contribute to that clarity could provide benefits 
throughout the spectrum of library and library science professionals. One concrete 
example of the value of this clarity is the matter of employment and compensation for 
that employment; if librarians can explain why their work matters, it is easier for their 
institutional and municipal peers and superiors to support that work. 
Although perhaps not as ambitious as William McGrath’s “Explanation and 
Prediction: Building a Unified Theory of Librarianship, Concept and Review,” we can – 
and, perhaps, should – embrace his idea of drawing together disparate fields of study for 
the purposes of advancing the theory of our discipline. While McGrath boldly draws 
allusions to Copernicus, who followed upon such luminaries of physics as Kepler, 
Galileo, and Newton, we can consider Woolwine and Scheiner, or Dewey and 
Ranganathan, as resources to unify a theory of library security. 
In exploring the established scholarship of library security, I have to come to see a 
close correlation between security practices and the philosophies of library and 
information professionals on the most fundamental level. The link between these two is 
made manifest in the form of policies. It is without question that all can be improved 
through further study.
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